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2 
Introduction 35 
 36 
Palliative care aims neither to hasten nor postpone death but instead offers support to people 37 
with advancing, incurable somatic illness (WHO, 2002). At the same time, individual nurses 38 
hold a wide range of views on euthanasia and end-of-life care, whilst the care-giving in 39 
clinical practice occurs in a social context in accordance with local and national policy 40 
(Quaghebeur et al 2009). Policy and practice must conform to the law, which defines  41 
liability in the end-of-life phase. However, as this paper highlights, the law has primarily 42 
focused on the criminalisation of euthanasia and less on the complex issues involved in the 43 
‘good death’ concept.  As a result, contemporary policy that helps to shape and direct end-of-44 
life care faces a tension between end-of-life liability and the way in which palliative care is 45 
developing (LACDP, 2014).    46 
The authors of this paper are not suggesting as a response to this tension that euthanasia 47 
should be legalised nor equating it with a 'good death'.  The central argument from the 48 
authors of this paper is different: that for end-of-life care to develop and progress, practice 49 
has to interface with law and policy to a greater extent. A better interface will facilitate policy 50 
and law to be shaped by the complexity and demands of practice decision-making, so 51 
allowing a better understanding of what the end-of-life process entails.   This is not to suggest 52 
that all end-of-life issues should be driven singularly by palliative care practice, but that a 53 
better future for the end-of-life entails the linking of law, policy and practice. Palliative care 54 
nurses have an obvious interest in the processes aimed at improving the interface between 55 
law, ethics and public policy.   The approach of this paper is significant at the current time 56 
when palliative care policy is being actively debated (LACDP, 2014; NCPC, 2014, NICE 57 
2015) with issues of communication between end-of-life care staff and patients as central 58 
(PHSO 2015; RCP, 2016).  59 
 60 
Euthanasia: the prevalence of criminalisation and its aims 61 
  62 
The legal landscape regulating conducts, which lead or may lead to the termination of a 63 
patient’s life, is patchy.  In 1993, in Bland, the House of Lords held that it was lawful for 64 
doctors to stop tube-feeding a patient in a "persistent vegetative state" if the continuation of 65 
feeding was not in the patient's "best interests".  Recently, the Bland judgment was extended 66 
to patients of a minimally conscious state. Also, in 1957, in Adams it was held that the 67 
hastening of death, which occurs or might occur as a result of the administration of pain 68 
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relieving drugs, is lawful under the doctrine of double effect.  Furthermore, the law 69 
recognises the right to refuse treatment by a patient, regardless of whether this decision leads 70 
to the end of life.  However, a competent patient cannot request any assistance in the 71 
termination of his/her life and as such the right to choose to die is not recognised.  Hence, a 72 
person responding to such a request that causes the patient’s death or who assists with his/her 73 
life termination is liable either for murder in the former instance, or for assisting suicide in 74 
the latter under s. 2 Suicide Act 1961.  Arguably, such cases would fall within the taking-of-75 
life scope and are therefore criminalised as euthanasia conducts.  The arising legal question is 76 
why situations such as Bland (or even Adams) do not constitute cases of taking-of-life and are 77 
therefore not euthanasia cases. The point is that there is neither a persuasive nor otherwise 78 
coherent legal explanation for this difference in classification.   Indeed, the appeal to the 79 
doctrine of double effect is characterised as a “most controversial legal issue with respect to 80 
palliative care” (Jost 2003). The situation is further confused because there is no legal 81 
definition of euthanasia. It appears, therefore, that whatever is intuitively regarded as 82 
euthanasia is criminally prohibited. Hence it has become a blanket term describing a multiple 83 
group of interrelated concerns.  Recently, Keir Starmer MP, formerly Head of the UK Crown 84 
Prosecution Service, indicated that “a factor making it more likely that someone will be 85 
prosecuted is that they are a doctor or a health professional assisting someone” (HC 86 
2015:Column 673).   Starmer’s observation echoes what Williams, a criminal law scholar, 87 
stated thirty years ago, that the law does not “leave the issue in the hands of doctors; it treats 88 
euthanasia as murder” (1983). 89 
 90 
Arguably, it is indeed the criminal prohibition which has dominantly influenced the public 91 
meaning of euthanasia and not cases, such as Bland or Adams, which decriminalised 92 
healthcare interventions that lead or may lead to the termination of life.  Notably, both the 93 
Bland best interest test and the Adams legitimisation of the doctrine of double effect operate 94 
in the form of case law (‘court law’), and have not received a statutory law form 95 
(Montgomery et al. 2014).  This has meant  their implications have not been sufficiently 96 
debated and they remain familiar only within the healthcare context.  In the public sphere, 97 
what prevails is the memory of the unwillingness of successive governments to legitimise the 98 
right to die for competent seriously ill patients.  The avoidance of addressing these issues in 99 
UK Parliament has set a blanket prohibition as the definer of the formal public meaning of 100 
euthanasia. 101 
 102 
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This direction signifies the primary interest in the protection of the sanctity of life, (Norrie 103 
2011), and especially the protection of the ‘vulnerable or immature’ (du Bois-Pedain 2003).  104 
Indeed, law and policy concerns have been defined by the ‘slippery slope’ fear and related 105 
nightmare of the development of an interplay between euthanasia and authoritarian policy 106 
choices (Freeman 1999; Keown 2002).
  
The argument is that if we compromise the principle 107 
of the sanctity of life for the sake of people with a terminal illness or those who are physically 108 
paralyzed, we risk the emergence of “various dangerous possibilities” for other groups where 109 
“their quality of life might be regarded as diminished, such as the long-term depressed, the 110 
mentally and physically handicapped” (Norrie 2011).  As Norrie claims, “a society with a 111 
population that is ageing and impoverished might be inclined to convert the permissive ‘can’ 112 
into the persuasive ‘ought’ (and then the required ‘should’?)” (2011).  The policy of blanket 113 
criminalisation therefore aims at preventing the emergence of any social, policy or 114 
professional culture, which will transform those fears into reality.  Certainly, there is a strong 115 
moral foundation which underpins this blanket policy.  Nevertheless, the blanket nature of the 116 
criminalisation also carries significant problems, such as the simplification of a number of 117 
issues relevant to end-of-life processes.  118 
  119 
The moral impact of criminalisation  120 
  121 
Blanket criminalisation along with the predominantly negative perceptions of euthanasia have 122 
colonised the public understanding of the end-of-life phase and disassociated it from the 123 
complexity, the pragmatism, and the positivity which the palliative understanding of ‘good 124 
death’ embodies.  Hence, the palliative understanding of ‘good death’ remains foreign to 125 
public discourse.   Selected examples can demonstrate how the criminalisation of the (legally 126 
non-defined) concept euthanasia has created a vague moral context, which overwhelms the 127 
questions, issues and needs of the end-of-life process.   128 
 129 
The moral impact of blanket criminalisation can be seen in the shaping of the semantics 130 
communicating the meaning of ‘good death’.  The public use of the concept of ‘good death’ 131 
seems to be expressed in galvanised language, which provides only galvanised meanings of 132 
the end-of-life process.  This is partially evident in the ‘End-of-life Care Strategy’, where 133 
authors’ describe a ‘good death’ in terms of the person dying being treated as “an individual 134 
with dignity and respect, in familiar surroundings, and in the company of close family or 135 
friends, and not being in pain or experiencing other distressing symptoms” (DH 2008).  This 136 
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perception is in line with ‘good death’ thoughts and feelings (which include dignity) and 137 
reference to being ‘made comfortable’ associated with an ability to relieve pain (Paddy 138 
2011). However, in this way the policy document builds a public picture of tranquillity, 139 
which moderates different beliefs, experiences and understandings of the often difficult end-140 
of-life phase.  Moreover, this definition fails to accommodate the concerns over ‘letting go’, 141 
which is increasingly becoming an issue as medical technology advances.  The reality 142 
commonly experienced by healthcare professionals is that death can be far from tranquil 143 
(PHSO 2015) and the picture of tranquility simplifies the ‘complex’ needs of this critical 144 
phase.  Nevertheless, despite its simplicity, the representation of ‘good death’ as a phase of 145 
tranquillity is inevitably the only type of public language which can be at ease with the strong 146 
moral sentiments of blanket criminalisation.  147 
  148 
The difficulty in choosing the appropriate policy language became evident in the debate of 149 
the Palliative Care Bill, which was introduced (unsuccessfully) by Caroline Spelman MP (HC 150 
2009); where what might constitute a ‘good death’ was also debated.  In her introductory 151 
speech, (HC 2009: Column 508), Spelman clearly disassociated the choice of when to die 152 
from the concept of ‘good death’ and asked the members of parliament to avoid any reference 153 
to this question.  This can be seen as a call for silence on a significant end-of-life issue in a 154 
debate on end-of-life policy and practice, during which Spellman (ironically) indicated to 155 
parliament members the need for ‘talking about death’ as the significant issue.  Hence 156 
Spelman’s anxiety, as a public person, to disassociate ‘good death’ from the controversy 157 
which surrounds the complexity of the choice of when to die (an issue which is morally 158 
influenced by the criminalisation of euthanasia), was apparent.     159 
  160 
The moral impact of criminalisation and the anxiety that it can cause within the policy 161 
context when issues of ‘good death’ have been involved, can be evidenced in the fate of the 162 
Liverpool Care Pathway for the Dying (LCP); a case relevant to the policy theories of ‘moral 163 
panic’ (Payne 2015). ‘Moral panic’ can be defined as the widespread ‘concern’ that a “threat 164 
exists, is serious and that ‘something should be done’”. Importantly, the “concern is not 165 
directly proportionate to objective harm”, and is also characterised by ‘volatility’. The mass 166 
media play a critical role in the fast development of a widespread concern. (Cohen, 2002: 167 
xxvi).  Usually, ‘moral panics’ and the related “concerns may lead to the labelling and 168 
stigmatising” of certain practices and “may precipitate harsh and disproportionate legislation” 169 
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(Cree, Clapton & Smith 2015). Arguably, due to the moral effect of the blanket 170 
criminalisation, the story of the LCP’s collapse embodies those defining elements.  171 
 172 
The LCP was recognised both nationally and internationally as a template to guide and 173 
enhance the care health professionals provided at the end-of-life for patients, relatives and 174 
carers. The policy aim was to transfer the gold standard of care provided by hospices to 175 
hospitals and community for those diagnosed as dying (Ellershaw & Wilkinson 2003). 176 
However, critical press reports threw a shadow over its use due to misguided perceptions of 177 
its application (Wrigley 2015).  The LCP was inaccurately portrayed as a non-caring 178 
bureaucratic tool which was used to hasten death of patients placed upon it, although this was 179 
not in any way its intention (Wrigley 2015).  Importantly, the moral connotations, 180 
communicated by the blanket criminalisation of euthanasia, functioned as fertile ground for 181 
the growth of a ‘moral panic’; namely, a widespread ‘concern’, otherwise anxiety, within the 182 
policy context about the public legitimisation of the LCP use.  The fast-developed ‘moral 183 
panic’ led to the independent Neuberger review of the LCP “More Care, Less Pathway” (DH 184 
2013).   Subsequently, the LCP, which was previously regarded as a recognised ‘good death’ 185 
policy framework, was phased out. The policy context payed less attention to the contribution 186 
of the LCP to the end-of-life process than to moral concerns surrounding the criminalisation 187 
of euthanasia. 188 
   189 
The practice interfacing with law and policy: Complexity versus simplicity 190 
  191 
The current health policy context was strongly influenced by the vision presented in the End 192 
of Life Care Strategy: Promoting High Quality Care for All Adults at the End of Life 193 
(Department of Health, 2008). It emphasised the need for high quality palliative care to 194 
enable a ‘good death’ in all care settings irrespective of diagnosis. It outlined the need for 195 
accurate data about end of life care, promoted clear clinical guidelines and the need to raise 196 
awareness about end of life care in the general population. However it did not focus on the 197 
requirement for a legal framework to palliative care practice.  198 
 199 
Indeed with respect to end-of-life care, the public interface between law, policy and practice 200 
has primarily been defined by the simplicity versus complexity conflict. The policy language 201 
of tranquility (and the arising policy anxiety when there appears a deviation from moral 202 
certainties) both reflect the underpinning existence of a simplified end-of-life public policy 203 
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framework.  As the previous examples demonstrate, the framework is founded in the 204 
premises of blanket criminalisation.  Within this framework, the complexity involved in 205 
‘good death’ practice isn’t apparent.  When professionals become involved with 206 
interventions, the timing of death is moved away from its natural progression and moral 207 
dilemmas subsequently arise.  If interventions were withdrawn, for example, the removal of 208 
intravenous fluids, to enable a person’s body to ‘naturally’ die then this decision can be 209 
interpreted as being detrimental just because a perceived treatment is seen to be withdrawn.  210 
However, if intravenous fluids were maintained, death could be viewed as ‘prolonged’; 211 
creating a time which is difficult for all concerned by predisposing the patient to distressing 212 
symptoms (Raijmakers et al. 2011).  Undoubtedly, the introduction/withdrawal of 213 
interventions constitutes a complex process which arguably can remove ‘natural’ death from 214 
clinical settings (Oehmichen & Meissner 2000) and can create an aura of doubt in relation to 215 
achieving a ‘good death’.  Therefore, the crucial point arising from such considerations is that 216 
the complexity of these decisions requires a deeper understanding of what legal and ethical 217 
issues are involved. 218 
  219 
However, the blanket criminalisation of euthanasia and its moral foundations still opt for 220 
moral simplicity and public policy certainty in relation to end-of-life questions.  Inevitably, 221 
current law and policy rhetoric cannot accommodate the complexity which is inherent in the 222 
end-of-life process and in the development of ‘good death’ practice.  The existing narrow 223 
framework can only increase the uncertainty surrounding professional dilemmas and it has 224 
been seen as unable to provide “realistic guidance for doctors”20 and healthcare staff in 225 
general.  226 
   227 
Examples of practice informing law and policy 228 
  229 
Notwithstanding the blanket criminalisation, the courts have been prepared to recognise at 230 
least some of the complexity surrounding the end-of-life process and demonstrated a relevant 231 
creative inclination (du Bois-Pedain 2013). The doctrine of double effect, which can be 232 
applied to the administration of pain relieving drugs and the concomitant hastening of death, 233 
“made its first appearance at common law” in the 1957 murder trial of Dr Adams (Ost 2005); 234 
a controversial and “unusual” trial (Devlin 1986).  Dr Adams was accused of intending to kill 235 
his patient by the administration of pain relieving drugs (R v Adams). The most significant 236 
feature of the trial was that the prosecution charge of murder was interfaced with the end-of-237 
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life reality: “Even if Dr Adams was forced to admit that he knew that the doses were large 238 
enough to kill, the [prosecution] still [had] to tackle his plea that all he was doing was ‘easing 239 
the passing’ in a case of an inevitable death” (Devlin 1986).   The trial was dominated by the 240 
perceptions of those health professionals who appeared as witnesses, turning a murder trial 241 
into an “interesting medical talk” (Devlin 1986).  The trial was also influenced by the medical 242 
profession’s concern with “the possibility of a verdict which would put a doctor who failed to 243 
prolong life in peril of a murder trial” (Devlin 1986).  Therefore, the birth of the legal 244 
understanding of the doctrine of double of effect took place within a context which dealt with 245 
complex professional meanings and concerns.  As it was held that a doctor may do “all that is 246 
proper and necessary to relieve pain… even if the measure … may incidentally shorten life” 247 
(R v Adams);
 
its outcome challenged the dominant understanding of euthanasia (Norrie 2011).
 
 248 
The court context successfully accommodated the requirement of a deeper understanding of 249 
complex healthcare decisions.  Foremost, this ‘alternative evaluation of law’ represented an 250 
attempt to inform legal definitions with a practice perspective.  251 
  252 
The most remarkable judicial decision which accommodated the controversies of end-of-life 253 
process was, undoubtedly, the judgment in Bland.  Bland was a landmark case, as it implied 254 
that passive euthanasia could be lawful even though there had been no legislative change in 255 
the law of murder.
 
 Notwithstanding the significance of this development, Bland importantly 256 
also brought palliative care issues into the forefront of policy thinking by requesting that “the 257 
moral, social and legal issues of the present case should be considered in Parliament” (HL 258 
1994).  As a response, the Select Committee on Medical Ethics produced a report which dealt 259 
with the euthanasia issues (HL 1994).  The Committee concluded that there was not sufficient 260 
reason “to weaken society's prohibition of intentional killing which is the cornerstone of law 261 
and of social relationships” (HL 1994).  Crucially, the committee also ‘welcomed’ the 262 
achievements in the field of palliative care, and called the Government to provide more 263 
resources.   264 
  265 
Bland and the subsequent report occurred at a transitional time for palliative care services and 266 
brought palliative care to policy attention.  Prior to 1990, the growth of palliative care had 267 
been due to the galvanising effect of a “bottom up” vision, leading to a sustained, rapid 268 
expansion of voluntary, locally-managed, hospice units and community services (Clark 2007; 269 
Wood J. & Clark D. 2008).  The early 1990s began a period of maturation and re-integration 270 
into mainstream care.  The following period was associated with a gradual strengthening of 271 
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the links between the palliative care voluntary community and the NHS bureaucracy 272 
(Hockley 2008). 
 
This integration has been associated with increased national social policy, 273 
evidence based practice guidelines and funding. Arguably, throughout those years, the 274 
channelling of professional experiences to the policy context constituted the most significant 275 
end-of-life care development.  The 2008 End-of-life Care Strategy constituted a significant 276 
policy step, as it accommodated, disseminated, and promoted ideas which emerged within 277 
local professional establishments; such as the exemplary case of the LCP which, as the End-278 
of-life Care Strategy indicated, had been developed by specialist palliative care teams (DH 279 
2008).
 
 Four years later, the End-of-life Care Strategy: Fourth Annual Report, which reported 280 
on the “progress in delivering the strategy”, indicated the success of the LCP with “over 281 
2,000 organisations in the UK” being “registered with the LCP central team, including 282 
hospitals, hospices, care homes and home teams” (DH 2012).  283 
  284 
Perhaps the post-Bland period should be seen as period of greater understanding of what end-285 
of-life care is about, and even more of what ‘good death’ is about.  The remark of Stephen 286 
O’Brien MP during the debate of the privately introduced Palliative Care Bill in 2009 is 287 
rather characteristic: 288 
  289 
“...‘a good death’. I dare say that if we track back only a few years, we as politicians 290 
would have been extremely chary about using that sort of phrase in the public 291 
domain. People recoiled from that slightly. It is a remarkable sign of how much we 292 
have come to understand the issues that surround this important matter” (HC 2009: 293 
Column 516). 294 
  295 
Arguably, the undercurrent trend of linking emergent practice lessons with the policy context 296 
should be seen as the significant event of this period.  297 
   298 
Cooperation: Practice, Policy and the Law 299 
  300 
Several times, members of UK parliament have unsuccessfully tried to introduce legislation 301 
to decriminalise assisted dying.  In 2015, Lord Falconer’s Assisted Dying Bill was debated, 302 
also unsuccessfully. The Government did not take any positional stance, and allowed “MPs a 303 
free vote” (Bingham & Kirkup 2014). During the parliamentary debate, 29 speakers 304 
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mentioned the word ‘palliative’ 70 times and demonstrated the conceptual tension between 305 
blanket criminalisation, the right to die and palliative aims (HC 2015).  306 
 307 
There are tantalising issues which need cooperation rather than conflict between practice, 308 
policy, and the law.   For example, the doctrine of double effect seems to function as an 309 
unsatisfactory legal solution to the palliative practice needs (Biggs 2001).   Additionally,  310 
there is a need to explore the doctrine under arising new evidence that pain killing drugs, 311 
properly used, need not hasten death potentially (Thorns & Sykes 2000).
 
  Continuous deep 312 
sedation also constitutes a controversial issue within end-of-life care.  Studies showed that 313 
“deaths in UK are particularly likely to involve continuous deep sedation” and this could be 314 
interpreted as a case of ‘slow euthanasia’ (Seale 2009).  Seale (2009) claims that “a better 315 
understanding of the context in which these decisions are taken is needed to assess this”; 316 
namely, a need for law to be informed by practice complexity.  The emerging trends 317 
discussed earlier demonstrate the value of this process, which can be a two-way process that 318 
also benefits practice when well-informed appropriate training is provided.  Professionals 319 
also need to understand the scope of their practice and avoid practice-routinisation (NICE 320 
2011).
  
For example, by the very nature of their diagnosis, a person with a life-limiting 321 
condition may be perceived as vulnerable, particularly if there are additional health needs, 322 
(learning disability or dementia, etc.), which may compound professionals’ understanding of 323 
treatment options. Training around vulnerable adults could support professionals with an 324 
appreciation of the meaning and implications of vulnerability. 325 
  326 
Even more importantly, ‘good death’ needs to develop beyond the mere interface between 327 
euthanasia and palliative care.   End-of-life processes should become more open to social 328 
policy questions.   For example, the dying person’s preference for setting the stage for their 329 
own death is not always straightforward.  Since the development of palliative care, there has 330 
been a slow but long-term shift in the place of death away from the home towards institutions 331 
(Gomes et al. 2013), which has been partly reversed in recent times, (ONS 2012), but still 332 
dominates. This risks the sequestration of patients who experience “dirty dying” away from 333 
the time and place in which they had imagined a ‘good death’ (Lawton 1998).  It has long 334 
been considered that ‘home is best’ and more ‘natural’ to a ‘good death’ by offering greater 335 
autonomy to the patient (Thomas et al. 2004).  However, people’s preference for dying at 336 
home may change with proximity to death, often because the degenerative nature of the body 337 
in death becomes progressively more difficult to manage (Thomas et al. 2004). These are 338 
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questions which demand social policy research initiatives, and they cannot be handled 339 
singularly by professionals.  A better future of the end-of-life phase entails the linking of 340 
policy and practice, but also the law’s awareness of this need. 341 
  342 
Conclusion 343 
This paper has argued that public policy should be less influenced by the legal preoccupation 344 
with criminalisation and euthanasia and more focused on practice concerns that allow a full 345 
range of considerations as to what might constitute a ‘good death’.  For end-of-life care to 346 
develop and progress, practice has to interface with law and policy to a much greater extent. 347 
Cooperation and dialogue between the three areas of practice, policy and law will allow a 348 
better understanding of what the end-of-life process entails and hence to allow room within 349 
policy and law to be shaped by the complexity and demands of practice decision-making.  350 
The needs of patients, families, and society more generally are all bound up within the 351 
concept of a good death, but in order to achieve this goal of end-of-life care we need the full 352 
integration of policy, law and practice initiatives. 353 
 354 
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